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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Introduction. 
The present matter involves a worker's compensation claim of injury, impairment and 
total disability related to an alleged exposure to an unknown chemical by Claimant, Lesia 
Knowlton, while working as a unit desk clerk at the Wood River Medical Center formerly 
located in Sun Valley, Idaho on September 12, 2000. Claimant contended that her alleged 
exposure resulted in the development of RADS, among numerous other medical conditions. A 
hearing was held on the matter on June 20, 2008, and following post-hearing depositions and 
briefmg, the presiding Referee and the Industrial Commission issued a decision on November 3, 
2009, holding that Claimant had failed to show that the symptoms she was alleging were related 
to the alleged exposure, that proper benefits had been paid during the six weeks following the 
incident and that Claimant was not entitled any further benefits. Claimant subsequently appealed 
to this Court following a failed attempt at a motion for reconsideration asserting that the 
Commission's findings were not supported by substantial competent evidence and rearguing the 
facts presented to the Referee below. 
As was expressed in the prior briefmg on this matter, this case is an excellent example of 
why the record must be considered in its totality. The presiding Referee and the Commissioners 
had available to them substantial medical and psychological records detailing Claimant's long 
medical history both before and after the incident in question. At the hearing on the matter, 
Claimant had an opportunity to testify in person and she answered questions from all counsel and 
the Referee. Also presenting live testimony at hearing was Defendants' primary expert, Dr. 
Stephen Munday. The record also consisted of twenty-nine deposition transcripts, including pre 
and post-hearing depositions of Claimant's co-workers, friends and family, medical experts for 
both sides and vocational and psychological evaluators. 
RESPONDENTS'/CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 1 
Defendants submit that the Industrial Commission had ample evidence to consider the 
question of causation, as it related to Claimant's assertions and that it properly determined that 
no further benefits were warranted. The Commission was faced with serious questions of 
credibility with respect to Claimant's version of the events as they transpired and the subsequent 
development of her symptoms. Defendants presented contrary medical evidence as to 
Claimant's alleged development of symptoms in the form of expert opinion from some of the 
country's most preeminent specialists in the field of toxic exposure. After appropriately 
weighing the facts and opinions, the Commission issued a sound and reasoned decision 
supported by overwhelming evidence, which should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Should this Court consider fmding in the alternative, Defendants have raised a number of 
issues on cross-appeal that need to be addressed, some of which impact the fundamental 
application of Idaho's worker's compensation laws as they relate to the Idaho Insurance 
Guaranty Association Act. On cross-appeal, the Defendants raise the question whether the 
Commission properly denied a motion to strike Claimant's post-hearing reply briefmg due to a 
page limit violation. Defendants contend that the Industrial Commissions Judicial Rules of 
Practice mandate a thirty page maximum limit for all briefmg, as opposed to thirty pages per 
brief, which if interpreted in that fashion would unfairly favor the Claimant, providing Claimant 
with double the number of pages as that of the defending party. 
With respect to the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association Act, to the extent that an award 
of benefits and/or fees is issued, Defendants question whether the Idaho Industrial Commission 
has subject matter jurisdiction over the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association and to what extent 
that jurisdiction extends, if any. In that same vein, the Defendants raise issue as to whether the 
Industrial Commission, or this Court for that matter, may issue an award of attorneys fees related 
to a worker's compensation award and/or appeal against the Guaranty Association. Defendants 
RESPONDENTS'/CROSS-APPEllANTS' BRIEF - 2 
submit that that the case law from neighboring states with the same or similar model statute 
provide guidance as to the limited power available to the Commission outside of the Worker's 
Compensation Act. 
B. Course of Proceeding Below. 
As mentioned above, Lesia Knowlton, (hereinafter referred to as "Claimant") asserts that 
she suffered a chemical exposure to her lungs on September 12, 2000. She subsequently 
prepared and signed a Form 1 Report of Injury or lllness to that effect on September 19,2000. 
See R., Vol. I., Exhibits, (Defendants' Exhibit No.1). On September 7,2001, Claimant filed a 
Complaint with the Idaho Industrial Commission alleging that " ... claimant was exposed to 
highly toxic sulfuric acid fumes" which resulted in " ... chronic cough, dyspnea, laryngitis, 
RADS and hyperactive airway, laryngospasm, dysfunctional larynx and epigastric reflux." See 
R. Vol. I, pp. 1-4. The initial Complaint was unsigned by Claimant and a new copy of the 
Complaint with her signature was filed September 11, 2001. See R. Vol. I, pp. 5-8. Both 
Complaints identified St. Luke's Regional Medical Center as the employer and Fremont 
Compensation Insurance as the surety. At the time of these Complaints, there was some 
confusion on Claimant's part as to whether St. Luke's had completed its purchase of the Wood 
River Medical Center. Claimant sought reimbursement for medical expenses and time loss 
benefits (TTDs). 
For reasons which will be explained further below, the case was inactive until May 12, 
2003, when Claimant filed an Amended Complaint identifying Wood River Medical Center as 
her employer and seeking additional worker's compensation benefits in the form of permanent 
partial impairment (PPI) and permanent partial disability (PPD). See R. Vol. I, pp. 9-12. An 
Answer was filed by defense counsel on June 9, 2003, on behalf of Wood River Medical Center, 
employer, and Cambridge Integrated Services, the administrator and successor in interest to 
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Fremont, who had subsequently gone bankrupt. See R. Vol. I, pp. 13-14. In the Answer, 
Defendants acknowledged a potential low level exposure to fumes but denied the extent of 
injury, if any, and the scope of the harm. Defendants contended that appropriate benefits had 
been paid to date and questioned whether Claimant was entitled to additional TTDs, medical 
benefits, PPI and/or PPD. Defendants also raised the issue as to whether Claimant's condition(s) 
could be apportioned to pre-existing issues. See Ul. 
On June 27, 2003, a Stipulation was filed with the Commission dismissing St. Luke's 
from the case and clarifying that Claimant was an employee of Wood River Medical Center at 
the time of her alleged injury. See R. Vol. I, pp. 15-16. An Order to that effect was issued on 
July 2,2003. See R. Vol. I, pp. 17-18. Defendants then filed a motion to substitute a party on 
August 25,2003, seeking to add the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association as an interested party 
due to Fremont's liquidation, pursuant to the Idaho Guaranty Association Act. See R. Vol. I, pp. 
19-32. With no objection from Claimant's counsel, the Referee issued an Order on September 
15, 2003, identifying the Idaho Guaranty Association as a successor in interest with respect to 
the litigation. See R. Vol. I, pp. 33-34. 
A motion to stay the proceedings was filed on October 9,2003, requesting that the matter 
be stayed until June 30, 2004, pursuant to an Order Appointing the Insurance Commissioner as 
Liquidator and Restraining Order issued by the California District Court and I.C § 41-3618. See 
R. Vol. I, pp. 37-51. The Referee, fmding no opposition to the motion, granted the request and 
issued an Order staying the proceedings on November 6, 2003. See R. Vol. I, pp. 52-53. The 
stay was scheduled to expire on June 30, 2004. 
In the interim, Claimant terminated the relationship with her initial counsel, Stratton 
Laggis, and retained new counsel, D. Scott Summer. Discovery and investigation into 
Claimant's allegations was renewed following the expiration of the stay. Claimant subsequently 
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tenninated her legal representation with Mr. Summer and Claimant's present counsel substituted 
in on August 5,2005. See R. Vol. I, pp. 54-55. 
Claimant's new counsel then requested a protective order on September 16, 2005, 
seeking to prevent Defendants from having Claimant examined by a medical expert in San Diego 
citing a number of unsupported bases. See R. Vol. I, pp. 56-57. Defendants responded by 
moving to compel Claimant's attendance at the 1MB and responding to the request for the 
protective order. See R. Vol. I, pp. 58-120. Following a hearing on the motions, the Referee 
denied Claimant's motion in its entirety and ordered Claimant to attend and cooperate with the 
1MB. See R. Vol. I, pp. 139-140. 
In the summer of 2006, Defendants requested calendaring of the evidentiary hearing on 
the matter, and due to scheduling issues, it was not set for hearing until March 8-9, 2007. See R. 
Vol. I, pp. 154-155. The issues for hearing included whether the condition for which Claimant 
sought benefits was caused by the alleged industrial exposure, whether apportionment to pre-
existing conditions was appropriate and whether Claimant was entitled to additional benefits in 
the fonn of TTDs, PPI, PPD, retraining, medical care and attorney fees. 
On February 22, 2007, Claimant filed a disclosure of witnesses, listing numerous alleged 
fact and expert witnesses not previously disclosed as potential witnesses at hearing. Defendants 
filed a motion and memorandum in support seeking to exclude the witnesses or in the alternative 
to vacate the hearing to allow for additional discovery on February 26,2007. See R. Vol. I, pp. 
156-168. Supplemental briefmg was filed by Defendants on February 27, 2007. See R. Vol. I, 
pp. 169-176. Claimant filed a responsive brief on February 27, 2007. See R. Vol. I, pp. 177-
212. The parties subsequently stipulated to vacate the hearing upon the condition that Claimant 
fully respond to discovery and identify her witnesses' testimony and partly due to a medical 
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condition of Claimant's counsel, which was approved by the Referee on March 1,2007. See R. 
Vol. I, pp. 213-215. 
Defendants filed a motion to suspend the proceedings and supportive briefmg on July 31, 
2007, due to Claimant's refusal to attend a psychological evaluation with Defendants' expert 
except under a myriad of restrictive conditions. See R. Vol. I, pp. 216-238. Further briefmg and 
affidavits detailing the detrimental effects Claimant's oppressive restrictions would have on the 
examination were filed on July 13, July 30 and August 1,2007. See R. Vol. I, pp. 239-248; see 
also R. Vol. II, pp. 249-261. On August 2, 2007, the Commission issued an Order granting 
Defendants' motion and staying the proceedings until such time that Claimant complied with 
attending the psychological evaluation. The only condition imposed by the Commission was to 
allow Claimant to record the examination at their expense. See R. Vol. II, pp. 262-263. 
On December 3, 2007, Claimant's counsel filed a request for calendaring. See R. Vol. 
II, pp. 264-267. Defendants agreed and the matter was set for hearing on June 20, 2008. See R. 
Vol. II, pp. 272-273. The matter proceeded to hearing in June, at which time Claimant and 
defense expert, Dr. Stephen Munday, presented live testimony. See Tr., 6/20/08. Admitted into 
the record at hearing were Defendants' Exhibits 1-34 and Claimant's Exhibits 35-57. See R. 
Vol. I, Exhibit Nos. 1-57. Following the hearing, the parties took nine post-hearing depositions 
which occurred over a time period from August, 2008, through April, 2009. See R. Vol. I, 
Exhibit (Additional Documents Nos. 21-29). 
Briefmg on the matter occurred during June and July of 2009. Claimant filed her opening 
brief with the Commission on June 10, 2009. See R. Vol. I, Exhibit (Claimant's Trial Brief, 
611 0/09). The brief was forty-six (46) pages, well in excess of the page limit requirements of the 
Judicial Rules of Practice and defense counsel contacted Claimant's counsel in objection. On 
June 12, 2009, Claimant's counsel filed a subsequent "opening brief' which was thirty (30) 
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pages long. See R. Vol. I, Exhibit (Claimant's Trial Brief, 6/12/09). Defendants filed their post-
hearing brief on June 26, 2009, adhering to the page limit rule. See R. Vol. I, Exhibit 
(Defendants' Post-Hearing Brief, 6/26/09). Claimant then filed a reply brief, consisting of thirty 
(30) more pages. See R. Vol. I, Exhibit (Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief, 7/10/09). 
In response to Claimant's reply, on July 10, 2009, Defendants filed a motion to strike the 
brief due to Claimant's failure to adhere to the page limit rule. See R. Vol. II, pp. 278-282. 
Claimant's counsel filed an objection to the motion to strike. See R. Vol. II, pp. 283-290. The 
matter was then taken under advisement by the Referee. 
On October 16, 2009, the Referee filed his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Recommendation. See R. Vol. II, pp. 291-304. In that decision, the Referee determined that 
Claimant failed to show that the symptoms for which she sought medical attention were related 
to the exposure to odors she experienced on September 12, 2000. He also found that Claimant's 
medical treatment during the six weeks following the incident was reasonably related 
precautionary to the potential exposure and Claimant was entitled to benefits during that period 
only.l The Referee felt that Claimant failed to show she was entitled to additional TTDs or any 
other worker's compensation benefits and deemed the remainder of the issues moot. The 
Referee also denied Defendants' motion to strike Claimant's reply brief without further 
comment. 
The Industrial Commission Commissioners reviewed the Referee's extensive decision 
and issued an Order concurring and adopting the Referee's recommendations on November 3, 
2009. See R. Vol. II, pp. 305-306. The Order was signed by Commissioners Thomas E. 
It is important to note that Defendants paid Claimant's medical expenses and worker's 
compensation benefits during this six week period and no outstanding benefits are owing. 
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Limbaugh and Thomas P. Baskin. Commission chairman R. D. Maynard was unavailable for 
signature and did not sign the Order. 
Claimant's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, along with a supporting 
memorandum, on November 20, 2009. See R. Vol. II, pp. 307-341. It resembled closely the 
prior briefmg submitted by Claimant following the initial hearing and was quite similar to the 
appellate brief filed by Claimant in the present appeal. Defendants filed a response to Claimant's 
motion on December 9,2009, criticizing Claimant for attempting to reargue the facts already in 
the record and considered by the Referee. See R. Vol. II, pp. 342-359. Claimant filed a reply 
brief on December 9,2009, and the matter again was taken under advisement. See R. Vol. II, pp. 
360-368. 
On January 14, 2010, the Commissioners issued an Order denying Claimant's motion for 
reconsideration. See R. Vol. II, pp. 369-373. Again, the Order was signed by Commissioners 
Limbaugh and Baskin. The Commissioners noted that they had reviewed the record with a focus 
on the concerns raised by Claimant and they felt that the facts supported the decision of the 
Referee. The analysis included an extensive review of the entire record, including the medical 
records, depositions and written opinions of the experts involved. The Commissioners 
determined that the Referee's decision was supported by "substantial evidence in the record" and 
that "Claimant presented no persuasive argument to disturb the decision." See ide at p. 372. 
Claimant filed a notice of appeal on January 28, 2010, alleging that the findings by the 
Referee and the Commissioners were not based upon substantial competent evidence. She also 
contended that the fmdings as a matter of law do not support the order and award and she 
requested an award of attorney fees and costs on all levels. See R. Vol. II, pp. 374-377. 
Defendants filed a notice of cross-appeal on February 8, 2010, seeking determination of a 
number of issues, including whether the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction over issues 
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involving the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association Act, whether the Referee appropriately 
denied Defendants' motion to strike Claimant's reply brief, and whether the Commission, if it 
does have jurisdiction, properly addressed a number of provisions under the Idaho Insurance 
Guaranty Association Act. See R Vol. II, pp. 381-384. The matter is now before this Court for 
determination. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Claimant is now 39 years old; however, at the time of her alleged exposure she was 29. 
Claimant worked part-time as a Unit Secretary at Wood River Medical Center in Sun Valley, 
Idaho. See R, Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 1. She was also a regular employee of the 
Gooding Hospital. At the time, she lived in Corral, Idaho and also worked as an EMT volunteer 
for Camas County. See R, Vol. I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 21, pp. 68-69. 
On September 12, 2000, Claimant was working at the nurse's station at Wood River 
Medical Center. Sometime during her shift, a toilet became backed up in Room 7, which was 
approximately twenty-five feet from her work area. Hospital maintenance staff worked on the 
toilet for some time. Claimant alleged that a product containing sulfuric acid was used on the 
toilet. See R, Vol. I, pp. 9-12. 
Claimant described noticing two different smells during the day in question. One was a 
pungent, rotten egg smell and the other was a citrus smell. Claimant alleges the fumes from the 
room in which the toilet was located permeated the halls of the facility. Claimant noted fans 
were placed in the area to try to ventilate the room. They were positioned in the doorway of the 
affected room and pointed out into the hallway which blew the fumes onto her. See R, Volume 
I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 21, pp. 84-85). 
Following the alleged exposure, Claimant was evaluated by Laira Thomas, a nurse 
practitioner, on September 15, 2000. She was complaining of cough, sore throat, and burning 
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when she took a deep breath. NP Thomas prescribed Claimant Bactrim DS and advised her to 
report the incident to her employer. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No.5, p. 13. Claimant 
saw NP Thomas on September 18, 2000. Claimant's lungs were clear bilaterally, but she still 
had a cough. Claimant had a chest x-ray taken that came back normal. See ide at p. 15. 
Claimant saw Dr. Thomas Pryor, a general practitioner, on September 25, 2000. She 
complained of persistent problems with coughing and hacking. She explained to Dr. Pryor that 
she had quit smoking following the alleged exposure. He noted no distress besides her severe 
hacking or coughing fits. He diagnosed possible toxic exposure to sulfuric acid with secondary 
bronchitis, which he thought would clear in two weeks. On September 28, 2000, Dr. Pryor saw 
Claimant again and noted that her cough was not as bad, but Claimant was sore in her upper 
chest. He diagnosed maxillary sinusitis secondary to insult inflammation in the sinus passages. 
He ordered her to continue the steroids. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No.9, pp. 4-5). 
On October 4, 2000, Claimant was again seen by Dr. Pryor and reported that she was 
doing better, but had relapsed when she smelled a household cleaner at the hospital.2 Dr. Pryor 
wrote that Claimant had failed to take her nasal steroid as prescribed and she was told to start. 
See id. at p. 6. Claimant saw NP Thomas on October 25, 2000, and asked to be placed on 
Wellbutrin. NP Thomas referred Claimant to Dr. Fullmer of Twin Falls for further treatment. 
See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No.5, p. 19. 
Dr. Fullmer had previously seen Claimant in November, 1988, for 
hypersomnolence/fatigue, hypothyroidism and potential depression. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, 
Def. Ex. No.2, pp. 1-4. He saw Claimant in relation to the present matter on October 13, 2000. 
Claimant complained of a worsening cough and hoarseness. She also described a burning 
2 There are no corresponding reports from the hospital detailing this alleged second exposure. 
It is unclear whether this even occurred at Wood River Medical Center or Gooding Hospital. 
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sensation in her upper chest. She alleged symptoms when exposed to animals, cold air, smoke, 
and other agents. Dr. Fullmer noted her prior chest x-ray was unremarkable without infiltrates. 
His assessment was possible inhalation exposure to sulfuric acid. He thought at most it was a 
low concentration exposure. He felt that she could have Reactive Airway Dysfunction 
Syndrome (RADS), but indicated this usually resolves over a period of a few months. He also 
considered underlying asthma or other unknown conditions. See id. at pp. 8-10. 
At Dr. Fullmer's request, Claimant underwent pulmonary function testing on November 
10, 2000 to rule out potential lung injury. Spirometry showed normal volumes and FEV ratio. 
There was a mild reduction of flow rates. Dr. Fullmer felt that Claimant was improving and 
asked her to return in 2 to 3 months for a check-up. See ide at pp. 11-13. 
Claimant next saw NP Thomas on December 11, 2000 and reported strange allergic-type 
reactions. They occurred after champagne, pie, MSG or sulfur containing items. She had itchy 
eyes and a rash on her throat. Claimant was diagnosed with a possible allergic reaction, but no 
relationship was mentioned regarding the alleged exposure. She was given an adult Epi Pen to 
use in case of emergencies. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No.5, p. 19. 
Claimant returned to Dr. Fullmer on December 20, 2000, for her two month follow-up 
appointment and complained of new food allergies causing swelling of the eyes and a rash. Dr. 
Fullmer noted that although there was a slight chance that the inflammation may be related to the 
exposure, some or all of her symptoms may be due to anxiety. He recommended she see an 
allergist and an ear, nose and throat specialist for further evaluation. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, 
Def. Ex. No.2, pp.14-15. 
Dr. Richard Henry, an allergist in Twin Falls, saw Claimant on December 27, 2000. 
Claimant described her exposure and complaints, as well as her aversions to strong odors, 
aerosol sprays, perfumes and scented soaps. She also discussed her rash. Dr. Henry diagnosed 
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non-specific hyperactivity of her airways. He noted her tobacco abuse as a contributing factor. 
He recommended she take Singulair, Maxair and Serevent and have allergy skin testing 
completed to determine the source of her reaction. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 10, 
pp.1-4. 
Unhappy with the conclusions made by Dr. Fullmer, Claimant next saw Dr. Holly J. 
Carveth, a pulmonologist at the University of Utah, on January 9, 2001. Claimant had been 
referred to Dr. Carveth by NP Thomas. Claimant relayed her version of the alleged exposure to 
Dr. Carveth. Claimant said she had improved somewhat from her severe shortness of breath, but 
she still had a cough. This was worsened when exposed to any irritant smell. She told Dr. 
Carveth she had quit working. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 17, pp. 1-3.3 
Dr. Carveth identified significant signs of GERD and associated symptoms. The GERD 
symptoms typically occurred one hour after eating and were made worse with curly fries. 
Claimant said she was very careful what she ate due to an onset of her "food allergies." Dr. 
Carveth had chest x-rays taken which were read as normal. A bronchoprovocation study was 
positive for moderate airway hyper-reactivity. Her pre-methacholine spirometry was normal. A 
methacholine challenge showed some reactivity. Dr. Carveth diagnosed RADS and paradoxical 
vocal cord motion or laryngospasm. She identified a component of severe anxiety which 
induced vocal cord spasm and recommended therapy. See id. 
Dr. Carveth recommended Claimant be evaluated at the Vocal Disorders Clinic at the 
University of Utah on January 10,2001. The technician there examined Claimant's throat with a 
flexible scope and video camera. Claimant's vocal cords were found to be fully mobile. There 
3 What Claimant failed to explain to Dr. Carveth was the fact that she had quit working at the 
hospital due to the difficulty she was experiencing as a result of losing her sister, as 
opposed to the alleged exposure or other related issues. See R.,Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 
21, p. 115. 
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was no evidence of paradoxic motion at the time of the exam. The technician noted that the 
tissue appeared to be healthy and there was no evidence of damage. The therapist recommended 
a short course of voice therapy. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 17, pp. 15-17. 
Claimant's next treatment with Dr. Carveth was three months later on March 20, 2001. 
Claimant complained that she could not walk by a perfume aisle in a department store, nor pump 
her own gas due to the fumes. Her food allergies were getting worse. Interestingly, Prilosec had 
been extremely useful in treating her severe GERD. Dr. Carveth noted that although a recent 
methacholine challenge was positive, her baseline spirometry was normal. Prompted by a 
conversation with Claimant's counsel, Dr. Carveth subsequently wrote a letter on June 4, 2001, 
stating that Claimant was incapable of working from the date of the alleged exposure. See R., 
Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 17, p. 37-38; 41. Dr. Carveth's letter presents an interesting 
contradiction, as Claimant continued to work through April 7, 2001, only quitting after her sister 
was killed in a car accident. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 21, p. 115 
In response to Dr. Carveth's letter, the surety approached Dr. Fullmer regarding his 
opinion on the matter. In a letter dated June 19,2001 to the adjuster, Dr. Fullmer indicated that 
his initial diagnosis was inhalation injury secondary to sulfuric acid exposure. He felt that 
Claimant was treated appropriately. He indicated he would expect Claimant to only suffer from 
symptoms as a result of the exposure for four to six weeks. He did not expect chronic sequela 
related to the problem. He explained the reason behind his referral to Dr. Henry, due to 
Claimant's development of multiple complaints, many of which he did not feel were associated 
with sulfuric acid inhalation exposure. He felt Claimant had reached MMI six weeks after the 
.!nim:Y and was doubtful that her continued symptoms were related to her exposure. Instead, he 
attributed those to anxiety or secondary gain related to the injury. Dr. Fullmer noted Claimant's 
possible laryngeal dysfunction/vocal cord dysfunction syndrome was more of a psychogenic 
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problem. He indicated she had no evidence of physical impairment or work restrictions. See R., 
Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No.2, pp.16-17. 
Claimant continued to treat with NP Thomas through the remainder of 200 1. During that 
time, Claimant began the application process for Social Security Disability benefits. Based upon 
Social Security's records, it appears they performed a cursory review of Claimant's medical 
records from Dr. Carveth, received and considered three letters allegedly from Claimant, Wood 
River Hospital, and the Camas County EMTs and did not conduct any independent verification 
of Claimant's allegations. There is no evidence that a physical examination or testing occurred. 
See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 18. 
In a letter dated December 7, 2001, Dr. Carveth reported in response to Dr. Fullmer's 
conclusions that she believed Claimant continued to have RADS and/or irritant-induced asthma 
due to the inhalation of sulfuric acid. She recommended evaluation every six months and 
restricted Claimant from in any environment with a potential chance of exposure. Dr. Carveth 
relied heavily upon written statements presented to her by Claimant, allegedly from co-workers 
at the Camas County EMT Service, indicating she had previously been a regular volunteer and 
could no longer do the work.4 Dr. Carveth issued a 25% whole person impairment due to irritant-
induced asthma and expressed disagreement with Dr. Fullmer's opinions. See R., Volume I, 
Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 17, pp. 43-44. Claimant submitted Dr. Carveth's records and 
correspondence as part of her Social Security application. Claimant was subsequently deemed 
disabled by Social Security in early 2002 and has been receiving benefits ever since. See R., 
Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 18. 
The Camas County EMT letter is of dubious origin and resembled another letter purportedly 
from an unknown individual at St. Luke's Wood River. Both of these appear to loosely 
resemble a letter penned by Claimant in support of her claim for Social Security Disability 
benefits. Claimant denied that she authored all of the letters, but they conspicuously 
contain similar information, grammar and formatting. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 18, 
pp.24-30. 
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Claimant saw Dr. Carveth six months later on May 31, 2002, and reported three 
significant spells of shortness of breath related to odor issues and cold temperatures. Dr. Carveth 
noted increased sensitivity to animal dander and pollen and continuing hay fever and food 
allergies. Claimant was tearful about her sister who had been killed in a car wreck the previous 
year. It was Dr. Carveth's impression that Claimant's symptoms were mildly abating and she 
was asked to return in six months for testing. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 17, pp. 
49-50. 
Claimant returned on December 6, 2002 for her regular follow-up visit and underwent a 
methacholine challenge test. Dr. Carveth compared the results to Claimant's 1217101 and 113101 
test results, and found them to be similar. Dr. Carveth continued to diagnose RADS and 
indicated Claimant was expressing significant anxiety and depression related to her illness, as 
well as her sister's death. Dr. Carveth started Claimant on Zoloft and recommended she return in 
six months. See id. at pp. 51-52. 
On July 26, 2003, Claimant again saw Dr. Carveth. Claimant reported her episodes of 
shortness of breath and chest tightness were unchanged. She claimed she worked on a limited 
basis as an EMT.5 She reported she broke out in hives after kissing her husband who had some 
sunblock on his lips. Dr. Carveth recommended using an Epi Pen if the hives returned and to 
limit her use of Prednisone. Dr. Carveth asked her to return in four to eight months for more 
tests. See ide at pp.56-57. 
Claimant returned to see Dr. Carveth and took a methacholine challenge on February 17, 
2004. At that time, she reported that she had improved somewhat. She had recently begun using 
5 The EMT records show to the contrary. In fact, they establish that Claimant's participation 
as a volunteer EMT was steady or increased from 2000 to 2004, with her being involved in 
21 incidents in 2000, 36 in 2001, 25 in 2002, 41 in 2003 and 12 in 2004, after which 
time she quit working for Camas County. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 32. 
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homeopathic medications which she felt were helping. She very rarely used her Prednisone. 
The baseline spirometry showed mild airway obstruction and the challenge test showed less 
hyperactivity than in the past. See id. at p. 58. 
On July 26, 2004, Claimant underwent an esophagogastroduodenoscopy ("EOD") by Dr. 
Frank Batcha. Dr. Batcha noted the procedure was being performed due to Claimant's 
uncontrolled OERD symptoms. Dr. Batcha had attempted an earlier EOD, however it had failed 
due to Claimant's gagging. Dr. Batcha saw multiple areas of discoloration below the surface of 
the gastric mucosa in the cardia and fundus consistent with petechia. Dr. Batcha diagnosed mild 
duodenitis with severe gastritis and later performed a Nissen fundoplication. See R., Volume I, 
Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 14, pp. 2-5. 
Claimant's next visit with Dr. Carveth was August 3, 2004. Claimant reported that she 
was doing relatively well. Incidents of chest tightness had become less severe. Claimant did 
complain of severe acid reflux symptoms, which were not abated by Prilosec or Zantac. 
Symptoms seemed to be worse at night time. Dr. Carveth examined Dr. Batcha's EOD report 
and noted that despite Claimant's high dose therapy, it showed normal small bowel mucosa. Dr. 
Carveth was uncertain to what extent Claimant's RADS symptoms related to her acid reflux 
problem. Dr. Carveth was unable to speculate whether additional acid reflux therapy would help 
her situation. She was also unable to make any determinations regarding her future disability. 
See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 17, pp. 59-60. 
For the most part, the remainder of Claimant's treatment involved regular check-ups 
mainly to refill her prescription medications. Defendants' counsel subsequently retained a 
number of experts to examine the medical and other records related to Claimant's treatment and 
allegations. The primary experts retained by Defendants specialized in the fields of medical 
toxicology and toxic exposure (Dr. Stephen Munday), allergies (Dr. William Wallace), 
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neuropsychology (Dr. Craig Beaver) and pulmonology (Dr. Ron Fullmer). See R., Volume I, 
Exhibits, Def. Ex. Nos. 2, 12, 30 and 31; see also Additional Document Nos. 26 and 28. 
Defendants also conducted a number of depositions, including Claimant's treating physicians, 
Dr. Carveth and Dr. Fullmer, to fully explore the extent of their treatment and opinions. See R., 
Volume I, Additional Documents Nos. 21 and 27. 
Dr. Stephen Munday was retained by Defendants in June of 2005 and was provided all of 
the medical records and hearing exhibits in existence at the time for his review. He is fairly 
unique in his background, in that there are only a handful of practitioners with similar experience 
in his field. Dr. Munday completed his undergraduate and medical training at the University of 
Florida and graduated in 1987. See Tr., pp. 124-125. Following that, he completed two 
residencies and one fellowship in public health and occupational medicine, occupational 
environmental health and environmental and medical toxicology. Dr. Munday is currently board 
certified in all three areas. See Tr., pp. 125-127. He has numerous articles published in the 
leading medical journals regarding toxicology subjects and has authored a number of textbook 
chapters in these fields. See Tr., pp. 125-127. Dr. Munday sees patients on a regular basis and 
estimated only 15 to 20% of his work involved IMEs for both sides. See Tr., pp. 128-129. Prior 
to this case, Defendants had not previously retained him for prior work. 
Dr. Munday conducted a physical examination and testing of Claimant in conjunction 
with allergist, Dr. William Wallace, and issued a report following his September, 2005, 
examination of Claimant. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 12. Dr. Munday's 
examination fmdings and conclusions were explained by him during his live testimony at the 
hearing on June 20, 2008. He testified at hearing that Claimant described to him her exposure 
and the onset of symptoms over that particular day. He noted that she initially complained of a 
sore throat and eventually developed a cough that evening or the next day. Claimant was 
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adamant that she had been exposed to a sulfuric acid based cleaner and that she noticed two 
distinct smells, a citrusy type smell and a rotten egg smell. See Tr., pp. 135-138. He testified 
Claimant further described her treatment over the next four to six weeks, including her referral 
and treatment with Dr. Fullmer. See id. 
Dr. Munday was then asked whether he treated patients who have had inhalation 
exposures to toxic chemicals and he explained that this type of exposure involved "a large 
portion of his practice" and that he had seen sulfuric acid exposures specifically. Tr., pp. 138-
139. Based upon his extensive background, Dr. Munday was then asked about Claimant's initial 
presentation and whether that was consistent with a sulfuric acid exposure. He explained that an 
exposure to a water soluble chemical, such as sulfuric acid, is dependent upon the concentration. 
Absent a high level of exposure, it is only going to affect the upper respiratory system, including 
the nose, mouth and eyes. Dr. Munday then noted that he was concerned with Claimant's 
description of the initial sequence of events because: 
" ... there is not [a] description of eye burning and significant nasal burning, 
which would be the first set of symptoms that would be anticipated and they 
would be so significant that you would expect somebody to actually leave the 
exposure if they were able to do so." 
See Tr., pp. 139-141. 
Dr. Munday then continued on to testify and summarize the treatment provided by Dr. 
Fullmer. He noted that Claimant began complaining of problems with "sulfa" based medicines 
and foods. See Tr., pp. 141-142. Dr. Munday was surprised that Claimant was alleging these 
problems because " ... there is no relationship between sulfuric acid and sulfa containing 
compounds ... as they are completely structurally diverse." See Tr., pp. 142, Ll. 4-7. He further 
testified Claimant eventually was referred to and was treated for an extended period with Dr. 
Carveth, during which time she had multiple methacholine challenge tests and subsequently 
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underwent an EGD and a Nissen fundoplication, which is a procedure perfonned on patients 
with severe gastric reflux. See Tr., pp. 142-143. 
Dr. Munday's testimony then turned to identifying symptoms of GERD and the fact that 
minor cases may not always be obvious to the patient until they become severe. He noted that 
GERD is often discovered when the offending stomach acid makes its way into the respiratory 
tract, causing "asthma like symptoms." See Tr., pp. 144-145. In light of this, Dr. Munday was 
asked to comment upon Dr. Carveth's diagnosis of RADS and the tendency to misdiagnose 
RADS versus GERD. What became critical to Dr. Munday in his determination that RADS was 
not the proper diagnosis was Claimant's development of skin complaints and odor issues, which 
were not consistent with the criteria that exists for the diagnosis ofRADS. (Tr., pp. 145-150). 
Dr. Munday also explained the danger of relying solely upon positive methacholine 
challenge testing results as the crux of a RADS diagnosis. He testified that this type of testing 
was excellent for ruling out asthma like problems, but that a positive test, "is fraught with 
problems, because it has a lot of what we call false positives." See Tr., pp. 149-150. He noted 
that if 100 non-asthma patients were tested, 10 to 20 percent would have positive test results, 
even when they don't have asthma. Id. With respect to Claimant's test results, Dr. Munday 
noted that Claimant, at most, was moderately reactive at times and then sometimes only had a 
little bit of variation. When asked whether these results were consistent with a RADS versus 
GERD diagnosis, Dr. Munday testified that the test results did nothing to tell you what the cause 
of the variation was. Instead, he cautioned that you have to look at all of the evidence, medical 
history and symptoms. See Tr., pp. 150-152. 
Dr. Munday then discussed what support he felt there was for a GERD diagnosis as 
opposed to RADS. He stated that there were three main reasons why he thought GERD was a 
more reasonable medical diagnosis. The first being the ultimate question of whether Claimant 
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was actually exposed to sulfuric acid. The second being her presentation in the days and weeks 
which followed, which was not consistent with a sulfuric acid exposure and Dr. Fullmer's 
agreement with that conclusion. And the third being the discovery of severe GERO and the 
development of non-RADS related skin and odor intolerances. See Tr., pp. 152-153. 
Ultimately, Dr. Munday felt Claimant was suffering from gastroesophageal reflux 
disease. She was also subject to an unknown aversion to odors, most likely "psychosomatic" in 
origin that required further exploration by a qualified expert. Based upon allergy testing done by 
Dr. William Wallace and Dr. Munday's own expertise in toxicology, Dr. Munday determined that 
Claimant was not suffering from any "allergic" type reactions from a potential sulfuric acid 
based exposure. To a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Munday did not believe 
Claimant had been exposed to sulfuric acid and he felt her subsequent symptoms were unrelated 
to a worker's compensation injury. See Tr., pp. 157-162. 
As mentioned above, Dr. William Wallace conducted an independent medical 
examination of Claimant in conjunction with Dr. Stephen Munday's evaluation on September 30, 
2005. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 30. Dr. Wallace graduated from the University 
of Oklahoma School of Medicine in 1967. After a few years in the Navy, Dr. Wallace completed 
a two year fellowship at UCSD in La Jolla, in allergy and immunology in 1974. He is board 
certified in the areas of allergy and immunology and also in pediatrics. He has served on the 
board of directors and as a program director and also the president of the Western Society of 
Asthma Allergy and Immunology. He has over 30+ years of experience treating patients in 
private practice and through his affiliations with a number of hospitals in the San Diego area 
including the Sharp Rees-Stealy Medical Centers. See R., Volume I, Additional Document No. 
26, Deposition of William Wallace, M.D., February 27,2009, pp. 6-8. 
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Dr. Wallace was asked to evaluate Claimant's allegations of multiple allergy-type 
symptoms resulting from her alleged exposure. Dr. Wallace testified at his deposition that he met 
with Claimant to discuss her medical history and the onset of her symptoms. She relayed the 
story of a chemical exposure and resulting cough and sore throat. Dr. Wallace was clear in that 
Claimant did not describe any" ... severe tearing or burning of the eyes or redness of the eyes." 
See id. at p. 12, Ll. 2-20. Claimant told Dr. Wallace that she had suffered for years from 
"seasonal sneezing, nasal itch, clear, running nose and nasal congestion" which occurred in the 
fall. See id. at p. 13, Ll. 1-3. Supposedly, these symptoms had worsened after the exposure. Dr. 
Wallace testified that when he asked her about new allergic reactions since the exposure, 
Claimant's history became "rather complex." See id. at p. 13, Ll. 4-10. 
Dr. Wallace explained Claimant told him she developed a cough, shortness of breath, 
symptoms of a skin rash and heartburn issues. She also related that she was now allergic to 
foods and other every day products, some of which contained sulfites. See id. at pp. 13-14. In 
response to Claimant's statements, Dr. Wallace was asked about the prevalence of sulfites in food 
and the chance that an individual may come into contract with this particular chemical. He 
explained that, " ... in the United States ever since probably the 70's or early 80's, there's been 
no sulfite in the foods other than wines" because of allergic concerns. See id. at p. 14, Ll. 1-12. 
Dr. Wallace proceeded to conduct a physical examination of Claimant. He found no 
abnormalities or signs of irritation in the eyes or the tympanic membranes. He did notice some 
irritation on the back of Claimant's throat. There were no abnormalities found in her lungs. See 
id. at p. 14-15. He testified he then proceeded to question Claimant about her home 
environment, at which time she revealed she lived on a farm with some animals, she heated her 
home with a wood stove and she slept on feather pillows. See id. at p. 16, Ll. 1-10. 
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Based upon Claimant's multiple allegations and Dr. Munday's request, Dr. Wallace 
proceeded to conduct a comprehensive panel of skin testing using the skin prick methodology. 
This involves injecting a small amount of a known allergen into Claimant's skin on her back. 
After a 20 minute wait, all test sites are subsequently examined for any signs of an allergic 
reaction, such as redness or welts. The welts would then be measured. See id. at pp. 16-17. Dr. 
Wallace stated he tested for approximately 80 to 90 of the most common allergens (animal 
danders, grass, pollen, etc.) and six major foods which had been of concern to Claimant. See id. 
at p. 18, Ll. 1-6. In Claimant's case, all of the skin tests for all of the different allergens were 
entirely negative. Dr. Wallace explained that in addition to the allergy testing, two "control" skin 
tests were run to assure the validity of the initial testing. Dr. Wallace testified that Claimant's 
skin reacted within normal limits to the control tests, which established full test validity. See id. 
at pp. 18-19. 
After discussing the test results, Dr. Wallace was asked to opine to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty whether there were any substances to which he felt Claimant was allergic, and 
he testified he was not aware of any. More specifically, when asked whether there was any 
relationship to the alleged symptoms of allergic reaction and a sulfuric acid exposure, he 
testified, "Other than the historical evidence presented by the patient, I found no relationship." 
Dr. Wallace could fmd no objective signs of any allergies of any sort at the time of his exam. See 
id. at pp. 21-22. 
In response to the questions raised by Dr. Munday and Dr. Wallace regarding Claimant's 
"psychosomatic" odor intolerances and the myriad of other symptoms alleged by Claimant, 
Defendants requested that she be evaluated by Dr. Craig W. Beaver on August 23-24, 2007. 
(Defendants' Hearing Exhibit No. 31). Dr. Beaver had available to him for review Claimant's 
entire medical history, her personnel and Social Security files and all depositions taken. His 
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post-hearing deposition was conducted on February 17, 2009. Dr. Beaver is a licensed 
psychologist with diplomate status in the area of clinical neuropsychology, which is the study of 
brain behavior relationships. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 31; see also R., Volume I, 
Additional Document No. 28, Deposition of Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D., April 9, 2009, pp. 5-6. 
As mentioned above, Dr. Beaver spent two days with Claimant, the fIrst day involved an 
interview and introductory testing, and the second day was devoted to comprehensive 
psychological testing. See R., Volume I, Additional Document No. 28, pp. 10-11. Dr. Beaver 
reviewed with Claimant the alleged exposure and her medical history. They also discussed all 
aspects of her life and other signifIcant events occurring before, during and after the alleged 
exposure. Of significance, Dr. Beaver testifIed that before the exposure, Claimant had gone 
through a divorce with her fIrst husband, who had been abusive to her and her children. That 
subsequently led to a drawn out fight over the custody of the children. Claimant's sister had then 
passed away within a few months of the alleged exposure and her father suffered a mild heart 
attack after that. Finally, Claimant's brother died traumatically in 2006. See id. at pp. 12-13. 
Dr. Beaver then testifIed regarding the emotional difficulties Claimant attributed to her 
alleged exposure. He explained Claimant felt that she was having more and more difficulty over 
time, especially as it related to her breathing problems, difficulty with cognition, anxiety and 
panic attacks. Ultimately, Claimant felt these problems combined with her other emotional 
issues to cause her to quit working. See id. at p. 17, L. 5 - p. 18, L. 5. Not surprisingly, Dr. 
Beaver testified that the increases in Claimant's emotional problems corresponded with increases 
in her physical symptoms. See id. at p. 18, L. 21 - p. 19, L. 7. At the time of the evaluation, 
Claimant reported to Dr. Beaver that she was suffering breathing episodes 6 to12 times a week, 
her voice quality was changing, and she was having trouble sleeping. See id. at p. 20. 
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Objectively, Dr. Beaver testified he did not notice any signs of difficulty in the two days 
he met with Claimant. See id. at pp. 21-22. Additionally, the neuropsychological testing results 
produced results contrary to Claimant's allegations. Neurocognitively, Dr. Beaver noted 
Claimant performed within normal limits and he did not see any evidence of neurocognitive 
deficits. Claimant was able to function normally with respect to her ability to understand tasks 
and complete projects, which called into question her claim that she was having difficulties in 
these areas. See id. at p. 23, L. 7-19. Dr. Beaver identified that Claimant was suffering from 
"some mild emotional distress" at the time of testing. He stated that Claimant "had a tendency to 
underestimate her emotional stress, a tendency to what [he] would call kind of psychologically 
naIve." He explained that Claimant probably doesn't acknowledge how her emotional stress 
may be affecting her in other ways, such as physically. See ide at p. 23, L. 20 - p. 25, L. 4. 
Ultimately, Dr. Beaver concluded that Claimant was fme cognitively and there could be 
no injury attributed to her alleged exposure in that regard. With respect to Claimant's anxiety 
and depression, he testified that there was overlap between a number of stressful situations 
occurring in Claimant's life, including her working two jobs, the alleged exposure, the death of 
her family members and her fight with her ex-husband which were causing her emotional 
distress. Tr., p. 29, Ll. 3-16. He went on to explain that, 
" ... from a mechanical physical perspective, you know, you can develop asthmatic 
symptoms and may, in fact have some predisposition towards it, there's been a 
number of studies that have shown emotional stress is a key trigger to those 
episodes,just as an example." 
See ide at p. 30, Ll. 12-18 (emphasis added). Dr. Beaver then testified that Claimant was more 
on the continuum towards the development of physical symptoms as a result of emotional stress 
based upon her psychological testing. He further noted her history indicated " ... pretty strong 
connection between her level of emotional stress and her respiratory difficulties." In fact, her 
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just thinking of a problem could lead to anxiety and an eventual attack. See ill. at pp 31-33). 
However, when asked whether the alleged exposure was a predominant cause of her 
psychological issues, Dr. Beaver testified: 
I think that it was a component of some of the kind of situational distress that she 
was having, and then her later kind of conviction about her respiratory problems 
and kind of that anxiety when she thinks she's going to have a breathing problem. 
But I don't think it was the predominant cause above all other causes because --
and she actually I thought was probably straightforward about some of this. 
There were a lot of other things going on in her life around this time that were 
also very stressful for her. 
You know, as we mentioned, she had the issue with her kids and the custody 
battle, the death of her sister, the heart attack of her dad, the later death of her 
brother. I think all of those things have played a significant role for her in the 
emotional distress that she had. 
See id. at pp. 34-35. He noted he agreed with Dr. Munday and Dr. Wallace's use of the term 
"psychosomatic odor intolerance" and noted that was a "reasonable explanation of some of the 
difficulties" Claimant was experiencing. He noted he would defer to the experts in the other 
fields as the issues related to causation and the medical aspects of the claim. See id. at, pp. 35-
36. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Industrial Commission's legal conclusions are freely reviewable by the Idaho 
Supreme Court; however, this Court will not disturb the Commission's factual fmdings so long 
as they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. See Wichterman v. I.H. Kelly, 
Inc., 144 Idaho 138, 140, 158 P.3d 301, 303 (2007). The Court construes the record most 
favorably to the party prevailing below, and does not try the matter anew. Hart v. Kaman 
Bearing & Supply, 130 Idaho 296, 299, 939 P.2d 1375, 1378 (1997). Substantial and competent 
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. 
Rives v. K.C. Logging, 134 Idaho 603, 607, 7 P.3d 212,216 (2000). Because the Commission is 
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the fact fmder, its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the evidence will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. This Court does not weigh the evidence or 
consider whether it would have reached a different conclusion from the evidence presented. Id. 
Issues of statutory interpretation begin with an examination of the literal language of the 
statute. Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 847, 216 P.3d 130, 136 (2009). "If the statutory 
language is unambiguous, [the Court] need not engage in statutory construction and are free to 
apply the statute's plain meaning." Id. 
III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the Industrial Commission err by denying Defendants' Motion to Strike 
Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief? 
B. Does the Industrial Commission have subject matter jurisdiction over the Idaho 
Insurance Guaranty Association Act, Idaho Code § 41-3601 et seq.? 
C. If the Industrial Commission has subject matter jurisdiction, did it err by failing to 
address the appropriate provisions of Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association Act, 
Idaho Code § 41-3601 et seq.? 
D. That the Defendants should be awarded their attorney fees and costs on appeal due to 
Claimant's frivolous pursuit of the claim. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Industrial Commission's decision that Claimant's condition was due to the 
result of pre-existing GERD or asthma was supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. 
Claimant, on appeal, resurrects the same factual arguments she presented to the Referee 
as part of her initial claim and then again on reconsideration. She claims that there was no 
evidence to support a diagnosis of pre-existing GERD and/or asthma, that she suffered an 
inhalation injury due to a toxic substance and that she developed RADS as a result of the alleged 
inhalation injury. Unfortunately, Claimant has presented no new facts or evidence, either on 
reconsideration or this appeal, that warrant a reversal of the Commission's fmdings. The factual 
discrepancies that she raises are inherently those already addressed by the trier of fact, and 
because the trier of fact issued a detailed, well-reasoned decision, there is no basis for this Court 
to revisit the evidence and substitute itself in the position of the Referee to retry the evidence. 
Clearly, the matter below involved significant questions of credibility, both on the part of 
Claimant as to her claims of injury and subsequent treatment and as to the qualifications and 
background of the medical specialists involved. As mentioned above, the presiding Referee had 
an opportunity to personally observe Claimant and her demeanor, in addition to having available 
to him a number of prior depositions of Claimant to compare and contrast. In addition, 
Defendants' primary expert, Dr. Munday, testified in person and was able to answer direct 
questions from counsel and the Referee regarding his expert fmdings and conclusions. 
Defendants contend that there was substantial and competent evidence to support the Referee's 
fmdings on all issues raised and that the Commission properly considered this evidence in its 
decision on reconsideration. 
Claimant's contention from the outset has been that she suffered an injury as a result of 
an inhalation exposure and that her symptoms were not indicative of a pre-existing, previously 
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undiagnosed condition. Her argument rests on the allegation that there are no medical reports 
pre-dating the alleged exposure to establish treatment for GERD/asthma, and as a result, her 
development of symptoms could only be due to the alleged exposure. Unfortunately, Claimant 
asks the Court to ignore the overwhelming medical evidence and focus solely on the temporal 
relationship of the development of her symptoms and the later diagnosis of GERD/asthma. 
Claimant provides no medical expert testimony to counter the actual fmdings that establish that 
the advanced nature of her GERD symptoms unequivocally show that her condition had to have 
existed prior to the alleged exposure. Additionally, Claimant's description of the symptoms 
following her alleged exposure given to her initial medical care providers invalidates her 
contention that she suffered an exposure that resulted in her symptoms. Her only "evidence" to 
counter the notes made by the medical providers at the time comes from self-serving statements 
from either herself or other family members testifying long after the fact. 
1. Causation. 
Generally, a claimant in a worker's compensation case bears the burden of proving 
entitlement to benefits. The claimant must prove not only that they were injured, but also that 
their injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. 
Neufeld v. Browning Ferris Indus., 109 Idaho 899, 902, 712 P.2d 600,603 (1985). A claimant 
must provide medical testimony which supports a claim for compensation to a reasonable degree 
of medical probability. Langley v. Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 
786, 890 P.2d 732, 737 (1995). A claimant is required to establish a probable, not merely a 
possible, connection between cause and effect to support his or her contention. Dean v. Dravo 
Corp., 95 Idaho 558,560-61,511 P.2d 1334, 1336-37 (1973) (overruled on other grounds Jones 
v. EmmeU Manor, 134 Idaho 160,997 P.2d 621 (2000». 
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This entire case focuses upon Claimant's alleged reaction to whatever chemical(s) were 
poured down the toilet in a patient's room down the hall from her desk at the Wood River 
Medical Center. As mentioned above, it was Claimant's burden to establish that she had 
suffered an inhalation injury that led to her subsequent conditions. On a very basic level, 
Claimant's theory of causation was flawed, due to her own claims of the severity of the alleged 
exposure. Whether a sulfuric acid based cleaner was used, or some other corrosive type 
chemical was involved in the incident, is irrelevant to the facts and evidence in the record and 
relied upon by the Referee and the Commissioners surrounding the alleged onset of Claimant's 
symptoms. 
As mentioned above, Dr. Stephen Munday, a well-respected and highly qualified expert 
in workplace exposures involving highly toxic and/or corrosive chemicals, explained that an 
exposure, as described by Claimant and that which is typically seen resulting in the injury, 
should have resulted in significant irritation and injury to all of Claimant's exposed mucus 
membranes. This would include the eyes, the nose and sinuses, the mouth, throat and lungs, with 
the most severe reactions occurring first in the eyes and nose. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. 
Ex. No. 12, p. 15; see also Tr., pp. 139-141. 
As was clear from Claimant's testimony at hearing and during her two prior depositions, 
she claimed that whatever chemical was poured down the toilet in the patient's room, it 
aerosolized and became airborne and was transported down the hall by fans placed by the 
maintenance personnel, permeating the air around her work station. See Tr., pp. 32-33 ; see also 
R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 21, pp. 78-82. Claimant alleges this occurred over a six to 
eight hour time frame, in which she stayed in her position, not once leaving to avoid the 
exposure or allegedly injurious effects of the cloud of gas hovering over her desk. See id. Her 
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ftrst indication of a problem began when she left the facility to eat a salad, the dressing of which 
supposedly irritated her throat. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 21, p. 93, L. 18. 
The medical records detailing Claimant's ftrst few weeks of treatment do not correspond 
with the symptoms of an individual exposed to an aerosolized chemical, such as sulfuric acid. 
See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 12, p. 15; see also Tr., pp. 139-141. The lack of 
signiftcant complaints of eye and nose irritation are clear indicators that the diagnosis of an 
external chemical exposure is incorrect. Dr. Munday had an opportunity to discuss the reasoning 
behind this conclusion in his extensive report and during his testimony at hearing. See ide He 
testifted that it was nearly impossible for a person to suffer such debilitating and life-altering 
symptoms, as alleged by Claimant, without having corresponding symptoms in the mouth, nose 
and eyes. See ide 
Interestingly, the Referee identifted his own personal experience working with corrosive 
chemicals and direct exposures he had suffered while on the job and discussed his reaction to 
said exposures with Dr. Munday during the hearing. See Tr., pp. 193-195. The Referee had 
worked in his youth as a technician at a battery recycling shop, where one of his duties was to 
recharge old car batteries by replacing their contents and reftlling them with new sulfuric acid. 
Id. He then described a number of times where the acid splashed onto his clothes, face and 
body. Those exposures resulted in some irritation because of the water soluble nature of the 
chemical and the potential sources of intrusion of the acid into the body. Clearly, he suffered no 
longstanding effects to direct exposure to the acid, which Dr. Munday described as a typical 
result due to the concentration of the acid. In the Referee's case, the acid was somewhat diluted, 
which effected its toxicity, or lack thereof. Dr. Munday then discussed in comparison, the 
extreme dilution of the chemicals in Claimant's situation. It became obvious at hearing that it 
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was illogical for Claimant to assert that the extremely diluted chemicals potentially reaching her 
work station could result in her subsequent symptoms. See Tr., pp. 196-200. 
Claimant presented no evidence at hearing to establish what concentration of sulfuric 
acid, or any other toxic chemical, she was exposed to. Claimant also presented no evidence to 
support a theory that the chemical, whatever it was, continued to aerosolize over a prolonged 
period of time. Finally, she presented no explanation why, if she was being exposed and 
suffering injury, did she not leave her station and avoid the chemical. 
It is uncontested that the alleged exposure in this matter stems from a single incident in 
which a chemical cleaner was poured into a toilet in a patient's room some distance from 
Claimant's work station. Dr. Munday testified at hearing the nature of such an action could have 
only resulted in a single event in which some of the chemical may have become aerosolized. See 
ide Interestingly, when the alleged concentration of the chemical was compared with the amount 
of water that it was introduced into and the surrounding volume of air in which it would have had 
to travel to reach Claimant's desk, it became patently obvious that any chemicals' injurious 
effect would have been extremely insignificant due to its overall physical dilution. See ide It is 
scientifically impossible for the Claimant to suffer the extent of injury alleged from the source of 
exposure that she described. See ide 
The record is also devoid of any evidence suggesting that anyone else in a facility the size 
of the Wood River Medical Center, whether patients or employees, suffered similar problems 
and/or injuries. Anecdotal testimony from one other employee acknowledges that there was an 
offensive smell at some point in the day. Neither of the maintenance workers complained of 
problems. There were numerous patients in the other rooms between the room being worked on 
and Claimant's desk. No evidence was presented to show even a complaint from them. 
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As a result of the above facts in evidence presented to the Referee and Commission, it 
was clear that Claimant's symptoms were not due to the sources alleged and that they could be 
attributed to an entirely different source. Due to the lack of significant eye, nose and mouth 
symptoms, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the irritation Claimant was allegedly 
suffering was the result of the insidious onset of a pre-existing condition, an internal cause. The 
case could have ended there. Defendants believe there was substantial and competent evidence 
to show that Claimant had not suffered an inhalation injury based upon these simple facts. 
However, the remainder of the evidence presented to the Commission further justified their 
conclusion that Claimant's symptoms were due to a pre-existing condition. 
2. GERDS/Asthma v. RADS. 
As described above, Claimant's treating physician, Dr. Ron Fullmer, a pulmonologist in 
Twin Falls, began to suspect at an early stage that Claimant's version of the alleged exposure did 
not comport with the myriad of symptoms she was alleging and his treatment recommendation 
turned quickly to other potential areas of concern, such as anxiety. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, 
Def. Ex. No.2, p. 10, 14, 16-17. At most, he believed that she had suffered from a minor 
exposure without lasting effect. See id. When the tide turned against Claimant, in the form of 
Dr. Fullmer rejecting her conclusion that she had suffered a significant exposure, she sought out 
a different pulmonologist, Dr. Holly Carveth, at the University of Utah. 
The medical records and deposition testimony indicate that Dr. Carveth wholeheartedly 
assumed Claimant's rendition of the alleged exposure was accurate. She had no other source for 
information, only what Claimant was telling her. She subsequently sought to treat Claimant's 
symptoms and was sympathic to her dramatic claims that she had developed numerous allergies 
as a result of the exposure. See R., Volume I, Additional Documents No. 21 (Carveth 
Deposition) pp. 55-56. Interestingly, it was Dr. Carveth that observed and diagnosed Claimant's 
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problems with GERD. It was during her ftrst visit with Claimant, on January 9,2001, that she 
discovered evidence of GERD, the severity of which she described as "signiftcant." See R, Vol. 
I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 17, pp. 1-3. Claimant's symptoms corresponded to the ingestion of 
certain foods and had allegedly worsened since the time of the exposure. See ide This critical 
observation, coupled with the examination of Claimant's esophagus later on, is extremely 
signiftcant in relationship to Claimant's overall claims. Dr. Munday made clear during his 
testimony that Claimant's description of a burning sensation in her throat on the date of the 
alleged exposure was consistent with her later food related GERD complaints diagnosed by Dr. 
Carveth. See Tr., pp. 142-145; 152-153. This early discovery in Claimant's treatment 
establishes that Claimant's GERD symptoms existed at the time of the alleged exposure and can 
reasonably account for the complaint of irritation she made on that day. See ide Dr. Carveth 
even questioned the relationship of Claimant's GERD symptoms versus a diagnosis of RADS 
and was unsure about the causal relationship, which Dr. Munday saw as signiftcant. See ide 
It is accepted in the medical community that GERD generally has a slow and insidious 
onset. It can be develop over a long period of time before the patient notices the development of 
irritation or pain associated with the acid reflux. Dr. Munday explained that it was quite 
common an individual complaining of GERD symptoms to attribute it to some other cause or 
have it diagnosed after believing they are suffering from some other condition. See Tr., pp. 144-
45. Unfortunately, Claimant's development of symptoms developed temporarily in relation to 
her alleged exposure. Nevertheless, Dr. Munday concluded that the severity of symptoms and 
the subsequent test results generated after the GERD diagnosis support a fmding that Claimant 
was suffering from GERD for some time prior to the alleged exposure. See ide From the date of 
the alleged exposure, on September 12, 2000, until the date of Claimant's first meeting with Dr. 
Carveth (January 9,2001), only 3% months elapsed. 
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Relying solely on temporal relationships ignores important medical facts and can lead to 
misdiagnosis. As Dr. Munday explained, evidenced based medicine considers all relevant 
information and facts and is not limited to a strict timeline. See Tr., pp. 160-61. Generally, 
diagnosing one condition versus another requires an examination of many criteria, only one of 
which is a temporal relationship. See ide 
Claimant's medical records leading up to the visit to Dr. Carveth identify problems she 
was having that correspond to her GERD diagnosis (burning throat, voice issues, etc.). 
Unfortunately, Claimant was mentally convinced that she had been exposed and so adamant in 
her belief, that her treating physicians were blinded by her allegations. As noted above, Dr. 
Carveth testified during her post-hearing deposition that her primary focus was treating Claimant 
and her symptoms, as opposed to taking steps to objectively establish causation for the source of 
Claimant's condition. Dr. Carveth noted that she would defer to the other specialists with 
respect to their particular fields of knowledge and it was her intent merely to help treat 
Claimant's present concerns. See R., Volume I, Exhibits, Def. Ex. No.2, pp. 96-97,103-04. 
Claimant's diagnosis of pre-existing asthma also goes hand in hand with the conclusion 
that she is not suffering from RADS developed as a result of an inhalation exposure/injury. 
Claimant places heavy reliance upon testing conducted by Dr. Fullmer and Dr. Carveth related to 
her pulmonary function as the foundation for her argument that she developed RADS. The tests 
most prominent with respect to Claimant's arguments are the methacholine challenge test and 
baseline spirometry. Interestingly, Claimant fails to point out that neither of these types of 
testing can be relied upon solely for a diagnosis of RADS and, at the most, only establish that the 
patient is suffering from some form of asthma. The tests are highly subjective based upon the 
patient's level of participation. Dr. Munday testified this type of testing was excellent for ruling 
out asthma like problems, but that a positive test, "is fraught with problems, because it has a lot 
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of what we call false positives." See Tr., pp. 149-150. He noted that if 100 non-asthma patients 
were tested, 10 to 20 percent would have positive test results even when they don't have asthma. 
Id. With respect to Claimant's test results, Dr. Munday noted that Claimant at most was 
moderately reactive at times and then sometimes only had a little bit of variation. When asked 
whether these results were consistent with a RADS versus GERD diagnosis, Dr. Munday 
testified that the test results did nothing to tell you what the cause of the variation was. Instead, 
he cautioned that you have to look at all of the evidence, medical history and symptoms. See Tr., 
pp. 150-152. 
Interestingly, Claimant's counsel relies upon a defmition of RADS from the web site 
Wikipedia, which points out the potential that asthma diagnoses might mistakenly be made in a 
cases of RADS. Unfortunately, Wikipedia is hardly a reliable resource for reliable medical 
information. By its own description, it is " ... a multilingual, web-based, free-content 
encyclopedia project based on an openly-editable model" upon which " ... anyone with Internet 
access can write and make changes to." Specifically, with respect to any content dealing with 
medical issues, Wikipedia succinctly notes that: 
"no warranty whatsoever is made that any of the articles are accurate. There is 
absolutely no assurance that any statement contained or cited in an article 
touching on medical matters is true, correct, precise, or up-to-date. The 
overwhelming majority of such articles are written, in part or in whole, by 
nonprofessionals. " 
See http://en.wikipedia.orglwikiIWikipedia:Medical disclaimer. Defendants suggest, in the 
alternative, the Court rely upon the discussion of RADS, the testing involved and the results 
generated contained in the testimony of the medical experts specializing in its diagnosis, as 
opposed to unreliable information source. 
Although Dr. Munday would agree that RADS is a form of irritant-induced asthma, he 
specifically explained that the criteria developed by Dr. Brooks and his colleagues for its 
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diagnosis hinge upon the fact that there has been a "high dose exposure to a pulmonary irritant." 
See R., Vol. I., Exhibits, Def. Ex. No. 12, pp. 38-39. Asthma symptoms identified by spirometry 
or methacholine challenge testing alone do not justify a diagnosis of RADS. There are a number 
of criteria that must be met before a definitive diagnosis can be made. See ide Claimant does 
identify some of the criteria in her briefmg, but takes exception to the weighing of the opinions 
of the medical experts by the Referee and the Commission in reaching the final outcome. 
Claimant attempts to argue that most, if not all, of the primary criteria for diagnosing 
RADS have been met. To the contrary, the evidence before the Commission established that 
very few of the RADS criteria were met. More importantly, as discussed above, there were other 
significant symptoms that existed that did not comport with a RADS diagnosis and were instead 
indicative of GERD. Defendants assert that Claimant failed to establish all of the necessary 
criteria for a RADS diagnosis and that she and her experts ignored the patently obvious 
symptoms related to her pre-existing condition. 
3. The Findings of the Referee were supported by the Evidence. 
Claimant's fmal attacks on the decision of her case focus on specific factual rulings made 
by the Referee. Claimant takes umbrage with a number of determinations that clearly deal with 
the Referee's conclusions with respect to Claimant's credibility and that of her experts. This 
Court has noted in the past that "Because the Commission is the fact fmder, its conclusions on 
the credibility and weight of the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly 
erroneous". Lorca-Merono v. Yokes Wash. Foods, 137 Idaho 446,451,50 P.3d 461,466 (2002). 
Many of Claimant's arguments regarding the Referee's factual fmdings suggest that his rulings 
were "unfair," "misconstrued," or otherwise "perplexing" because he did not construe the facts 
in the same light as her. 
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Unfortunately, Claimant's own actions and demeanor at hearing served to taint her 
version of the events following the alleged exposure; casting doubt as to whether she had 
accurately relayed her symptoms and conditions to her medical care providers. It has been noted 
that "[o]nly through live cross-examination can the fact-fmder observe the demeanor of a 
witness, and assess his credibility." International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 
1257, 1265 (5th Cir. 1991). Claimant suggests that, " ... the Referee searched the voluminous 
record created over a period of nine (9) years to fmd any inconsistency that would discredit 
Claimant." See, Appellant's Brief, p. 37. Fascinatingly, it was the myriad inconsistencies in 
Claimant's own records that were her downfall. The Referee did not have to search very hard. 
As is apparent from a cursory review of her treatment, Claimant's allegedly symptoms worsened 
to a degree that apparently made her incapable of doing anything. It is interesting that Claimant 
has presented no evidence to establish why or how she continues to progressively suffer injury 
from an exposure occurring almost ten years ago. 
Claimant's second-guessing of the Referee and Commissioners' interpretation of the facts 
is exemplified in her claim that the Referee's conclusions regarding the record do not·correspond 
to her recollection that she developed voice problems (hoarseness) during the week following her 
injury. See R., Vol. II, pp. 295, "Finding #8." She suggests that the Court should rely upon her 
sympathetic family members and fmd that she developed hoarseness immediately. 
Unfortunately, none of these statements by the individuals questioned are time specific enough to 
place them within the time period discussed in the fmding. Instead, the Referee is left to rely 
upon the most detailed record, the medical record, to establish when the hoarseness occurred, 
which is opposite to Claimant's recollection. 
Claimant also asserts that being prescribed Wellbutrin six weeks after the exposure 
should not be interpreted to imply that she may have continued to smoke after the incident. See 
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R., Vol. II, pp. 296, "Finding #13." It is unclear where in the actual rmding that the Referee does 
imply that she had continued to smoke. The Referee is only identifying that she received 
Wellbutrin with regard to her past smoking habit. Claimant's mischaracterization is trivial and 
only seeks to interject confusion into a very clear decision and record. The discussion of her past 
smoking habits later on in the decision was important, only because Claimant inconsistently 
reported how much she had smoked in the past to medical care providers. Claimant did not 
provide her doctors with a clear picture of her smoking past. Obviously, she intended to 
downplay her habit, which may have contributed to the onset of her symptoms. It does raise an 
interesting question as to why she would need Wellbutrin for the smoking issue if she had kicked 
the habit months prior as she alleged. 
The remainder of Claimant's allegations of factual discrepancies made by the Referee 
constitute a rehash of the issues raised on reconsideration and found to be invalid or 
unpersuasive as to the final outcome by the Commissioners. Again, Claimant seeks to reargue 
the case with no new evidence and or legal arguments that warrant a reversal. The testimony of 
the medical experts, especially that of Dr. Munday, was insurmountable when coupled with 
Claimant's own credibility issues and the basic scientific and medical concepts involved in her 
alleged exposure. Adequate time and consideration were given to all opinions and Claimant's 
allegations were found to be unsupported by the evidence. The Referee, and ultimately the 
Commissioners, properly considered and weighed the evidence before them and made a 
reasonably sound decision. 
B. The Industrial Commission erred by denying Defendants' Motion to Strike 
Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief. 
In the alternative that this Court overrules or otherwise reverses the Industrial 
Commission's decision on the underlying facts and law and remands it for further proceedings, 
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Defendants contend that the presiding Referee erred by denying Defendants' Motion to Strike 
Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief for failing to comport with the Commission's own rules on 
page limits for all briefing. Defendants contend that the Judicial Rules of Practice provide that 
each party is entitled to thirty (30) pages total for post-hearing briefs. Claimant submitted almost 
sixty (60) pages in briefing, where Defendants complied with the Rule. As noted above, the 
Referee summarily denied Defendants' motion without further comment or analysis as part of his 
decision on the matter. See R. Vol. II, p. 292. 
The Industrial Commission's Judicial Rule of Practice and Procedure unambiguously set 
forth that "no brief in excess of 30 pages, exclusive of any addendum or exhibit, shall be filed 
without the Commission's prior approval." J.R.P. l1(A) (emphasis added). As if to allay any 
doubt, the Industrial Commission commented that "[s]ubsection A limits briermg to 30 pages 
unless prior approval is obtained for additional briefmg." J.R.P. II(A) cmt. (emphasis added). It 
is well established that the Industrial Commission must follow its own rules and that defendants 
cannot be subjected to aberrant procedural maneuvers. See generally, Madrano v. Neibaur, 136 
Idaho 767, 768-770, 40 P3d 125,126-128 (2002). In Madrano, this Court determined that it was 
an abuse of discretion for the Industrial Commission to disregard its own rules to the detriment 
of defendants. Id. Consistent with this legal mandate, the Industrial Commission erred when it 
failed to strike the non-complaint filing. 
The Industrial Commission and its hearing officers are constrained by clear statutory 
wording even it the result is harsh and arbitrary. See Petrie v. Spalding Drywall, 117 Idaho 382, 
383-384, 788 P.2d 197, 198-199 (1990). This Court has indicated that administrative regulations 
are subject to the same principles of statutory construction. See Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 
Idaho 581, 586, 21 P.3d 903, 908 (2001). Where the language is unambiguous, there is no 
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occasion for the application of the rules of statutory construction. Kootenai Electric Co-op, Inc. 
v. Washington Water Power Co., 127 Idaho 432, 435, 901 P.2d 1333, 1336 (1995). 
Judicial Rule of Practice and Procedure 11 clearly limits the party's briefmg to thirty (30) 
pages absent prior approval. Conspicuously, the Rule does not allow claimants in excess of 
thirty (30) pages due to the fact that they have the opportunity for opening and reply briefmg. 
Any other interpretation would be the equivalent of defendants filing their response brief in 
separate volumes upwards of sixty (60) pages as long as the individual briefs do not exceed thirty 
(30) pages. Obviously, this maneuvering clearly contravenes the unambiguous language of 
J.R.P.l1. 
Claimant's combined briefmg exceeds thirty (30) pages. The record is devoid of any 
formal filing or decision granting Claimant additional pages. As such, in accord with its own 
Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Industrial Commission should have struck 
Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief because she exceeded the thirty (30) page limit. 
C. The Industrial Commission does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Idaho 
Insurance Guaranty Association Act. 
In the event that this Court overrules or otherwise reverses the Industrial Commission's 
decision on the underlying facts and law and remands it for further proceedings or orders the 
imposition of an award of additional benefits or attorney fees, Defendants request that the Court 
determine whether the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to order the Idaho Insurance 
Guaranty Association to pay Claimant's medical benefits. The Association maintains that while 
the Commission certainly has the authority to establish the amount of any such benefits, it lacks 
the authority to require the Association to make payment therefor. 
It is well settled law that an administrative agency is "limited to the power and authority 
granted it by the legislature." Roberts v. Transportation Dept., 121 Idaho 727, 732, 827 P.2d 
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1178, 1183 (Ct.App. 1991). The authority granted to an agency is primary and exclusive "in the 
absence of a clearly manifested expression to the contrary." Id. (citing Fischer v. Sears 
Roebuck & Co., 107 Idaho 197,200,687 P2d 587, 590 (Ct.App. 1984» (emphasis added). More 
importantly, the agency "may not exercise its sub-legislative powers to modify, alter, enlarge or 
diminish the provisions of the legislative act which is being administered." Roberts, 121 Idaho 
at 732. While there is no question that the Commission "was intended to have exclusive 
jurisdiction over all disputes arising under the worker's compensation statutes," that 
jurisdiction ends where "the legislature otherwise provided." State of Idaho, ex reI, Industrial 
Commission v. Quick Transport, Inc., 134 Idaho 240, 243,999 P.2d 895, 898 (2000) (emphasis 
added). The question then becomes whether the Commission has authority to exercise 
jurisdiction over the Association arising under the worker's compensation statutes, or whether 
another statute controls. The issue of whether the worker's compensation statutes or the Idaho 
Insurance Guaranty Act grants jurisdiction over a case involves a question of statutory 
interpretation over which this Court exercises free review. See State v. Hagerman Water Right 
Owners, 130 Idaho 727, 732, 947 P.2d 400, 405 (1997). 
The Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association Act (the "Act") was enacted in 1970 for the 
purpose of "affording protection to persons having 'covered claims' against insurance carriers 
who had become insolvent, and to spread and assess the cost of such protection among insurance 
carriers." She"ard v. City of Rexburg, 113 Idaho 815, 816, 748 P.2d 399, 400 (1988). As the 
Court of Appeals of Idaho previously noted, the Association "is a creature of statute," and it 
therefore maintains "those powers and obligations given to it by the Legislature." Maguire, 
Ward, Maguire & Eldredge v. Idaho Ins. Guaranty Assoc., 112 Idaho 166, 730 P.2d 1086 
(Ct.App. 1986). Other courts, whose states have also adopted the model act, have elaborated on 
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this issue. For example, the California courts have described the California Insurance Guaranty 
Association (CIGA) as follows: 
CIGA is not, and was not created to act, as an ordinary insurance company. It is a 
statutory entity that depends on the Guarantee Act for its existence and for a 
defmition of the scope of its powers, duties, and protections. CIGA issues no 
policies, collects no premiums, makes no profits, and assumes no contractual 
obligations to the insureds. CIGA's duties are not co-extensive with the duties 
owed by the insolvent insurer under its policy. Instead, CIGA's authority and 
liability in discharging its statutorily circumscribed duties are limited to paying 
the amount of covered claims. 
Denny's, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 104 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1438 129 
Cal.Rptr.2d 53, 56 (Cal.App., 5th Dist., 2003). In other words, any authority asserted by, or 
liability determined against CIGA may be done only by means of the statute which created it. 
The Act, patterned after a model act, requires only that the Association pay "covered 
claims," defmed as unpaid claims "which arise out of and [are] within the coverage ... of an 
insurance policy to which this act applies .... " See I.e. §41-3605. The Act further provides that 
the Association is not obligated to pay any amounts "in excess of the obligation of the insolvent 
insurer ... " I.C. §41-3608. As such, nothing in the Act may be deemed to enlarge the 
Association's obligations beyond those owed under the policy or coverage under which any 
claim arose. 
Concerning the powers and obligations extended to the Association, the Idaho legislature 
established that the Association was to "perform its functions" and "exercise its powers through 
a board of directors." See I.e. § 41-3606. It is therefore up to the board of directors to 
administer the Act, which necessarily includes not only determining whether Ms. Knowlton's 
claim was a "covered claim" within the meaning of the Act, but whether other prerequisites of 
the Act have been met. In light of these statutory requirements, the Idaho Insurance Guaranty 
Association Act, like CIGA, is governed wholly by the Act, and any liability on the part of the 
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Association arises solely under the Act. The Commission's authority may not exceed issues 
arising under the workers' compensation statutes, and because the liability of the Association can 
only arise under the Act, the Commission simply lacks the jurisdiction to require the Association 
to pay on behalf of Fremont. 
This Court addressed a similar situation in Bantz v. Minnesota Insurance Guaranty 
Association, 124 Idaho 780, 864 P.2d 618 (1993), where the Minnesota Insurance Guaranty 
Association (MIGA) had also raised jurisdictional issues. Interpreting a similar statute which 
required that MIGA's board would determine whether claims submitted for payment were 
"covered claims," the Court held that the issue of "whether the MIGA fund covers a particular 
claim ... or the amount of damages arising from that liability, must be determined" by MIGA, 
not by a district court in Idaho. Bantz, 124 Idaho at 787. Because the Minnesota statute required 
MIGA's board of directors to determine whether the claim was covered, the district court did not 
have jurisdiction to determine whether coverage applied to MIGA. See id. 
The Industrial Commission would be acting outside of the bounds of its jurisdiction in 
this matter if it was allowed to assess liability against the Association. While the Commission 
may have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under the worker's compensation statutes, the 
issue of whether Claimant's claim is a "covered claim" under the Act falls outside Title 72, 
Idaho Code. Similarly, the issue of whether Claimant has exhausted all claims under any other 
policies or sources of reimbursement (such as Medicare) arises under the Act, not the worker's 
compensation statutes, and the Commission therefore lacks jurisdiction to assess liability to the 
Association solely for any underlying expenses. Like the Minnesota statute at issue in Bantz, 
Idaho's Legislature has established that the Association, acting through its board of directors, is 
responsible for administering matters under the Act - including the ability to perform those acts 
"necessary or proper to effectuate the purpose" thereof (see I.e. § 41-3608(2)(e». Having 
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reserved those powers to the Association, the Commission necessarily lacks jurisdiction over the 
subject matters in this instance. Subject matter jurisdiction "is a key requirement for the 
justiciability of a claim and cannot be waived by consent of the parties." Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. 
Granata, 99 Idaho 624,626,586 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1978). 
A judgment or order "by a tribunal without authority, or which exceeds or lies beyond its 
authority, is necessarily void, and may be shown to be so in collateral proceedings, even though 
it be a court of general jurisdiction, because no authority derived from the law can transcend 
the source from whence it came." Id. (quoting Wright v. Atwood, 33 Idaho 455, 462, 195 P. 
625, 627 (1921» (emphasis added). Furthermore, a void judgment or order "may be entirely 
disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it." 
Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 286, 207 P.3d 1008, 1016 
(2009). Because the Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this case, any order 
potentially assessing responsibility for further medical benefits against the Association would be 
void. 
D. If the Industrial Commission does have subject matter jurisdiction, it should be 
directed to comport with the appropriate provisions of the Idaho Insurance 
Guaranty Association Act. 
Even if this Court determines that the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction and is 
able to issue an award against the Association, such an award should be limited to the extent that 
Claimant has other sources of reimbursement which have not been exhausted. Additionally, an 
attorney fee award, as requested by Claimant for the underlying matter is barred by statute and 
any such fmding by the Commission should be structured to comport with the Idaho Insurance 
Guaranty Association Act. Both of these issues were raised at the evidentiary hearing on the 
matter and in the subsequent briefmg, but were deemed moot due to the underlying decision by 
the Commission. Should the Court choose to remand the case to the Commission for further 
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proceedings, these issues need to be addressed to provide the Commission with a clear statement 
as to how the Act should be applied. 
As noted in the preceding section, the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association Act was 
patterned after a model act, and its purpose is to "avoid fmancial loss to claimants or policy 
holders because of the insolvency of an insurer." Maguire, 112 Idaho at 167. In that sense, it is 
identical to the numerous other state guaranty association acts also patterned after the model act, 
including the California Insurance Guaranty Association Act, of which it has been said: 
CIGA was created by the Legislature to establish a fund from which insureds 
could obtain fmancial and legal assistance if their insurers became insolvent and 
do not discharge their obligations under their insurance policies .... 
CIGA issues no policies, collects no premiums, makes no profits, and assumes no 
contractual obligations. Thus, CIGA is not an ordinary insurance company and 
does not act as one. Its powers, duties and responsibilities are strictly defmed and 
circumscribed by statute; they are not co-extensive with the duties owed by the 
insolvent insurer. 
California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 153 Cal.AppAth 
524, 532, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 855, 859-60 (Cal.App., Second Dist., Div. 6 2007). Given the nature of 
CIGA, the other courts interpreting its statutory powers and obligations have aptly noted that it 
"is not an insurer and does not stand in the shoes of an insurer but, rather, is an insurer of last 
resort." Klaiber v. Dytec Central, Inc., 361 1ll.App.3d 166, 170, 836 N.E.2d 171, 174 (lll.App., 
First Dist., Div. 5, 2005). 
The Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association, like its counterpart in California, is a non-
profit entity, and while the Association makes assessments against member insurers in order to 
obtain funds necessary to pay the obligations of the association, it does not collect premiums or 
otherwise act as an insurance company. In fact, the Association, like CIGA and so many of its 
sister associations in other states, is an "insurer of last resort." Like the California act, Idaho and 
several other states have adopted express language from the model act which clearly establishes 
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that exhaustion of all other policies from solvent insurers is required before the Association has a 
duty to pay: 
Any person having a claim against an insurer, whether or not the insurer is a 
member insurer, under any provision in an insurance policy other than a policy of 
an insolvent insurer which is also a covered claim, shaH be required to exhaust 
first his right under such policy. Any amount payable on a covered claim under 
this act shall be reduced by the amount of any recovery under such insurance 
policy. 
I.C. § 41-3612 (emphasis added). See also, VentuleU v. Maine Ins. Guaranty Assoc., 583 A.2d 
1022, 1023-24 (Maine, 1990); Spearman v. State Security Ins. Co., 57 lll.App.3d 393, 395, 372 
N.E.2d 1008, 1009 (Ill.App., First Dist., Div. 1, 1978); Lovelace v. Pennsylvania Prop. & Cas. 
Ins. Guaranty Assoc., 874 A.2d 661, 664 (Penn. 2005); Cline v. Pacific Marine Ins. Co., 619 
So.2d 1256, 1260 (La.App., Third Cir., 1993). 
Because the Maine Insurance Guaranty Association Act (MIGA Act) so closely mirrors 
that adopted in Idaho, a look at the VentuleU case is helpful. There, the claimant was involved in 
a work related accident in Connecticut, where the rear end of his truck was hit by a truck owned 
and operated by a Maine corporation. The claimant collected benefits under Massachusetts 
workers' compensation law, including a lump sum settlement. VentuleU, 583 A.2d at 1022-23. 
The claimant then brought a tort action against the driver of the other vehicle in the United States 
District Court in Maine. Following a trial on that action, the federal court in Maine entered a 
judgment in claimant's favor, which claimant then sought to enforce against the Maine Insurance 
Guaranty Association (MIGA) through the state court in Maine. See id. at p. 1023. Using 
language which mirrors exactly the statement of purpose enunciated by the Maguire court, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld summary judgment in favor of MIGA, noting that the 
"primary purpose" of the MIGA Act is to "avoid fmancial loss to claimants or policyholders 
because of the insolvency of an insurer." Id. The Ventuleu court also noted that additional 
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limitations were "directly relevant" to the court's analysis, which limitations again mirror almost 
verbatim those contained in Title 41, Chapter 36, Idaho Code, including not only the exhaustion 
provisions at I.C. § 41-3612, but also the defInition of a "covered claim" set forth at I.e. § 41-
3605(7). Having cited the Maine corollary to those sections, the court noted: 
Together, these provisions make MIGA a guarantor of last resort. Even when an 
insolvent insurer's policy would have provided primary insurance for a claim, the 
effect of the insolvency is to render that insurance excess coverage. By the 
"exhaustion" requirement of the fIrst sentence of section 4443 ( 1), a claimant must 
fIrst look beyond MIGA for insurance coverage. By the second sentence of that 
same section, MIGA's obligation to the claimant is reduced by whatever amount 
the claimant recovers from any other insurance sources .... Also, the last sentence 
of the defmition of "covered claim" in section 4435(4) makes clear that no insurer 
may recover from MIGA by way of subrogation or otherwise. Thus, the 
legislature has opted to protect MIGA and its guaranty fund from all but last 
resort claims against insolvent insurers, and to let other insurers bear the losses 
for which they can underwrite and charge appropriate premiums. 
ld. at pp. 1023-24 (emphasis added). 
In the present matter, Claimant has other sources of insurance and coverage for her 
medical expenses. Claimant cannot seek to recover against the Association until all other 
potential coverage has been exhausted. Claimant has been deemed disabled by Social Security 
and received benefits through the federal government, both for her disability and her medical 
expenses. Only upon the exhaustion or a denial of these benefIts would the Association be in a 
position, under the Act, to be responsible to pay. The policy underlying the Act could not be 
clearer, in that it was designed to avoid loss to claimants, not sureties, when another surety 
becomes insolvent. Though this Court has not yet had an opportunity to address the exhaustion 
element, the legislature clearly intended to pass the risk of insolvency on to other sources of 
coverage, not to claimants and not to the insolvent sureties or the Association. 
In addition to the extent of what benefIts can or may be awarded against the Association 
should this Court fmd jurisdiction for the Commission under the Act, the question of whether the 
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Commission may issue an award of attorney fees if the matter is remanded also must be 
addressed. As was argued before the Commission, to the extent that Claimant requests attorneys 
fees and costs for unreasonable denial, Defendants believe that I.C. § 41-3605(7) presents a bar 
to such a claim. As discussed above, the Act identifies what is considered to be a "covered 
claim" for purposes of payment by an insurance guaranty association. Subsection 7 explains that 
"covered claim" shall not include any amount awarded as "punitive or exemplary damages". See 
I.C. § 41-3605(7) 
The purpose for awarding attorney fees in worker's compensation cases is for the purpose 
of punishing a surety for an unreasonable denial. Attorney fees are not granted to a claimant as a 
matter of right under the Idaho worker's compensation law, but must be recovered only under the 
circumstances set forth in I.C. § I.C. §72-804. Poss v. Meeker Machine Shop, 109 Idaho 920, 
926,912 P.2d 621 (1985). The Worker's Compensation Act specifically designates attorney fees 
as "punitive costs," which was seemingly affirmed by this Court in Idaho State Insurance Fund 
v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 980 P.2d 556 (1999). Per the Insurance Guaranty Association Act, 
the Legislature superseded such awards of punitive or exemplary damages against the 
Association pursuant to the provisions of I.e. §41-3605(7) by specifically excluding "punitive" 
awards. As such, said fees cannot and should not be awarded against the Idaho Guaranty 
Association. 
Nevertheless, the evidence shows that the denial of Claimant's further benefits was based 
upon the opinions of Claimant's own treating physician, Dr. Fullmer, who felt Claimant's 
ongoing symptoms were psychosomatic in nature and unrelated to the exposure. I.C. §72-804 
applies only when the employer's or surety's conduct has been "unreasonable." Dennis v. 
School District #91, 135 Idaho 94, 98, 15 P.3d 329 (2000). Claimant failed to present 
substantial and competent evidence establishing that Defendants unreasonably denied benefits. 
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v. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Claimant has requested an award of attorney fees on her appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 41 and I.C. § 72-804 on the grounds that the employer and surety unreasonably 
denied payment of further benefits to Claimants. In response, Defendants contend that Claimant 
has not established an adequate foundation for attorney fees related to the underlying matter or 
the present appeal. Defendants reasonably relied upon Dr. Fullmer's response to specific 
questions as to Claimant's condition as a basis for contesting the payment of further benefits. 
Claimant has not shown any evidence that this denial was unreasonable per se. Additionally, 
Defendants refer the Court to the argument presented above and hereby adopt said argument by 
reference with respect to the request for fees on appeal as the imposition of attorney fees due to 
their punitive nature, as described in Section 72-804 is precluded under the Idaho Insurance 
Guaranty Association Act. 
Defendants, on the other hand, request an award of fees and costs related to this appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and 11.1 due to the frivolous nature of the appeal. 
Defendants suggest that the Referee reasonably interpreted the facts and evidence in the record 
and made the proper conclusion regarding causation. Claimant's motion for reconsideration and 
subsequent appeal after the motion's denial constitutes a frivolous and unreasonable attempt to 
pursue a claim without foundation, which warrants an attorney fee award. See Keller v. Rogstad, 
112 Idaho 484, 733 P.2d 705 (1987). As is evident from the procedural history described above 
and evidenced in the appellate record, Claimant has continuously attempted to abuse the 
worker's compensation process and obfuscate Defendants' efforts to prepare a reasonable 
defense to her claims. Claimant's actions, by seeking to solely to dispute the trier of fact's 
factual fmdings by pointing to irrelevant alleged conflicts in the evidence, warrant the imposition 
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of fees pursuant to the above-cited rules. See Kreb. v. Kreb., 114 Idaho 571, 759 P.2d 77 (Ct. 
App.1988). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the above and foregoing reasons, this appeal must be denied. As a threshold matter, 
Claimant has presented no new facts or issues of law that justify retrying the case on this level. 
Additionally, as a substantive matter, the facts and evidence presented below establish a sound 
foundation for the Referee and the Commissioners' decisions. Should the Court choose to 
overrule the decision below, there are significant issues of law that need to be addressed as to the 
scope of the Industrial Commission's jurisdiction as it relates to the Idaho Insurance Guaranty 
Association. Respectfully, Defendants request that the Court deny Claimant's appeal, affirm the 
decision of the Referee and Commissioners below and issue an opinion as to attorney fees and 
costs on appeal. ~ 
::J-tJ..J(-
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